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INTRODUCTION

The issue has been described as "the most important question to
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face the legal profession,"' an "Armageddon,

2
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and a "salvation."3

Despite the vastly differing views, multidisciplinary practices
("MDPs") have the potential to revolutionize the legal profession.
Many thought the American Bar Association's ("ABA") House of
Delegates' resounding rejection of a proposal to allow MDPs in July

2000 was a crushing victory for opponents of MDPs.4 Yet even after
the Enron-Arthur Andersen scandal (which many consider an
additional argument against MDPs), the battle over whether lawyers
should be allowed to practice and share fees with non-lawyer
professionals in MDPs continues to rage. While the ABA does not

approve of most forms of MDPs, proponents continue to be vocal.
Several jurisdictions, including New York and Washington, D.C., now
allow limited professional collaborations.6
Contrary to the ABA's initial hopes, the MDP debate is not

over.

The creation of professional practice partnerships, such as

those between lawyers and accountants, mental health professionals
or physicians, is seen by many as the vanguard of an inevitable
professional revolution.7
Despite the ABA's rejection of MDPs, lawyers and other
professionals have found ways to work together without violating
state law or professional ethical responsibilities. The most noted
context in which lawyers and non-lawyers collaborate to provide

professional services is in the Big Five (now the Big Four) accounting
firms.8 The Big Five Boom, the first instance in which large

1. Karel Ourednik IV, Multidisciplinary Practice and Professional Responsibility
After Enron, 4 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 167, 167 (2003); see also Robert A. Stein,
Multidisciplinary Practices: Prohibit or Regulate?, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1529, 1529 (2000)
(noting that resolving of the issue whether to regulate or prohibit MDPs will affect nearly
all lawyers).
2. J. Emery Baker, Multidisciplinary Practice: Armageddon or Salvation?, ARIZ.
ATr'Y, May 2000, at 24.
3. Id.
4. John Gibeaut, "It's a Done Deal": House of Delegates Vote Crushes Chances for
MDPs, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2000, at 92.

5. See Ourednik, supra note 1, at 170 (noting that the lawyers at Arthur Andersen
were involved in the demise of Enron).
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. See Ted Schneyer, Multidisciplinary Practice, Professional Regulation, and the
Anti-Interference Principlein Legal Ethics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1469,1473 (2000).

8. See infra Part IV.A. The Big Five include Ernst & Young LLP, Deloitte &
Touche LLP, PriceWaterhouseCooper, KPMG LLP, and Arthur Andersen LLP. While
Authur Andersen collapsed in the wake of the Enron scandal, this Comment refers to the
Big Five generally, as all five professional service firms have contributed to the MDP
debate. The author only refers to the Big Four when discussing the current or future
impact of these large professional firms.
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accounting firms directly employed lawyers, was primarily driven by
corporate client demand for professional service firms and "one-stop
shopping" to accommodate their complex, interdisciplinary needs.'
Smaller collaborations of lawyers and non-lawyers also provide
various professional services in a one-stop shopping format.' These
boutiques generally focus on individuals and their personal issues
such as medical care, elder law,11 financial planning, and family
disputes like child custody and divorce. 2 The professionals involved
are often lawyers, mental health professionals, physicians, and
financial planners.13 While both large and small "de facto MDPs" are
restricted by state rules of professional conduct, 4 as long as client
demand for MDPs increases, professionals (lawyers and non-lawyers
alike) will find ways to offer such services, and the push for the
legalization of MDPs will continue.
In exploring the intense and important debate over whether
lawyers should be allowed to participate in MDPs, this Comment will
show that MDPs do and should continue to benefit the legal
profession, but only in a limited capacity. Regulation should depend
not only on the size of the firm but also on the professions
participating, the services rendered, and the clientele involved.
Furthermore, a complete overhaul of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rules"), as has been suggested, 5 would be more
harmful than beneficial to the legal profession. Part I recites a brief
history of the MDP debate. Part II discusses the difficulties
surrounding the present ban of MDPs in Model Rule 5.4 as well as

9. See Gianluca Morello, Big Six Accounting Firms Shop Worldwide For Law Firms:
Why Multi-discipline Practices Should Be Permitted in the United States, 21 FORDHAM
INT'L L. 190, 238 n.299 (1997).
10. See infra Part IV.B.
11. See M. Courtauld McBryde, Comment, The Future of Multidisciplinary Practices
in North Carolina: Love 'Em or Hate 'Em, North Carolina's Only Option is to Regulate
Them, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 193, 195 n.13 (2001).

12. See Steven Keeva, A Multidoor Law Office, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2003, at 96 (discussing
Boston Law Collaborative, a multidisciplinary dispute resolution firm, and services it
provides).
13. See infra Part IV.B.

14. Although the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct are not binding on any
jurisdiction, they have been adopted by roughly forty states in some capacity. L. Harold
Levinson, CollaborationBetween Lawyers and Others: Coping With the ABA Model Rules
After Resolution 1OF, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 133, 133 n.1 (2001). Unless specific state
rules of professional responsibility are mentioned, this Comment is referring to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.
OF

15. See ABA COMM. ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE
[hereinafter 1999 REPORT], http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
DELEGATES (1999)

mdpreport.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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various domestic and international jurisdictional approaches. Part III
explores the primary arguments of opponents and proponents of
MDPs. In examining present de facto MDPs, as well as other ways in
which professionals can work together, Part IV details examples:
both professional service firms 6 that represent large corporations,
and small boutiques, which include other professionals in addition to
accountants, and whose primary clients are individuals and small
businesses. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that small MDPs
that provide services for individual clients can and should work in the
United States. A blind, unquestioning acceptance of MDPs, however,
would be harmful to the profession; rather, as the ongoing debate
shifts from "if" and "when" to "how," the legal community should
take advantage of the lessons that can be learned from current de
facto MDPs.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE MDP DEBATE

The ABA defines an MDP as:
[A] partnership, professional corporation, or other association
or entity that includes lawyers and non-lawyers and has as one,
but not all, of its purposes the delivery of legal services to a
client(s) other than the MDP itself or that holds itself out to the
public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal, services.... [I]t
also includes an arrangement by which a law firm joins with one
or more other professional firms to provide services, including
legal services, and there is a direct or indirect sharing of profits
as part of the arrangement. 7
The two key components of this definition-partnerships
between lawyers and non-lawyers who provide legal and non-legal
services, and profit sharing (a.k.a. fee splitting)-have long been
proscribed by professional responsibility principles. The first express
prohibitions on lawyer/non-lawyer partnerships and fee sharing arose
in 1928 when Canons 33 to 35 were added to the original 1908 Canons
of Professional Ethics. 18 Canon 33 provided that partnerships
between lawyers and non-lawyers should not be formed if part of the
16. The term "professional service firm" is not a term of art. It is used in this
Comment to refer to large firms such as the Big Five that handle a variety of corporate
work.
17. 1999 REPORT, supra note 15.
18. See Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of
Purchasing Legal Service from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICs 217, 240-41 (2000).
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partnership consisted of the practice of law.'9 Canon 34 proscribed
lawyers from fee splitting with non-lawyers. 2° The Model Code of
Professional Responsibility strengthened these prohibitions by
expressing them in mandatory rather than precatory language. 21 The
1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct also clearly prohibit a
lawyer from fee sharing and forming partnerships with non-lawyers.2
Recent economic trends, however, have caused many to rethink these
longstanding prohibitions.
The MDP debate is the result of a variety of domestic and global
economic changes in the past decade, most significantly the expansion
of the Big Five accounting firms both domestically and overseas.23
Also fueling the debate are "[t]he collapse of the professionalism
paradigm in the late twentieth century, the globalization of the world
economy, the substantive convergence of law and law-related
disciplines, and the complex needs of individual and corporate clients
24
for advice that draws on those converging disciplines.
In response to these compelling new forces, the ABA House of
Delegates created the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
("Commission") in 1998 to "determine what changes, if any, should
be made to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct with
respect to the delivery of legal services by professional services
firms."25 The twelve-person Commission, made up of lawyers, judges
and academics,2 6 was employed "to study and report on the extent...
and the manner in which professional service firms operated by
accountants and other [non-lawyers] are seeking to provide legal
services to the public." 7 Thus, the ABA's primary goal was to
determine if lawyers were aiding these firms in the unauthorized

19. 1908 CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 33 (1928).

20. Id. at Canon 34.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-103; DR 3-102; DR 5-107
(1969); see also George C. Harris and Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access
to Legal Services and What We Can Learn From the Medical Profession's Shift to a
CorporateParadigm,70 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 779-82 (2001) (discussing the precatory
terms of the initial prohibitions).
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2004) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]. For a more complete history of the progression of professional responsibility, see
generally Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics
of Self-Defeat and a Callfor a Return to the Ethical, Moral,and PracticalApproach of the
Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV. 411 (2005).
23. McBryde, supra note 11, at 195.
24. Daly, supra note 18, at 222.
25. See 1999 REPORT, supra note 15.
26. See Ourednik, supra note 1, at 173.
27. See 1999 REPORT, supra note 15, at App. C.
21.

486

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

practice of law, and if so, to prevent it. 8
The Commission scrutinized the effects of MDPs on clients,
lawyers, accountants, and the rules of professional conductparticularly with respect to conflicts of interest and client
confidentiality.2 9 In August of 1999, after significant investigation,
hearings, and discussions,3 ° the Commission issued its unanimous31
Recommendation and Report to the ABA House of Delegates. The

Commission recommended that MDPs be permitted, subject to
certain restrictions.32 These restrictions included: (1) guidelines for
lawyer-controlled MDPs,3 3 (2) policies that placed the onus on

lawyers to ensure that other professionals followed the Model
Rules,34 (3) five possible models of MDPs,3 5 and (4) a hypothetical
28. 1999 REPORT, supra note 15.
29. One scholar noted that the Commission focused its studies on four basic
questions:
First, how would clients be harmed or benefited by amending the Model Rules to
permit lawyers to enter into MDPs? Second, how would the lawyers' independent
professional judgment be impaired by allowing these arrangements? Third, how
different are the standards that govern the conduct of accountants and accounting
firms? Fourth, if the Model Rules were amended to permit MDPs, what changes
should be made in the rules to preserve client confidentiality and avoid conflict of
interest?
Stein, supra note 1, at 1540-41.
30. The depth of the Commission's study was significant:
[T]he Commission ... heard sixty hours of testimony from fifty-six witnesses from
around the world and received written and oral communications from numerous
others. Testimony and/or written materials [were] presented by U.S. and foreign
lawyers, consumer advocates, representatives of four of the five largest accounting
firms in the world, law professors, chairs of ABA sections and standing
committees, officers of foreign and domestic bar associations, ethics counsel of
foreign and domestic bar associations, small business clients, the American
Corporate Counsel Association and in-house counsel of international
corporations.
1999 REPORT, supra note 15.

31. Many were surprised that the Commission produced a unanimous report. See
Stein, supra note 1, at 1541.
32. See ABA COMM. ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, RECOMMENDATION TO
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1999)
[hereinafter 1999 RECOMMENDATION],
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecommendation.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). The provisions urging that restricted MDPs be
permitted are contained in Recommendation 3.
33. Id.
The provisions regarding lawyer-controlled MDPs are contained in
Recommendation 12.
34. Id. In Recommendation 8, conflicts of interest and imputation are discussed.
Recommendation 10 requires lawyers "to ensure ... [a] non-lawyer's conduct is
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer."
35. The models are (1) the Comparative Model; (2) the Command and Control
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"Model Rule 5.8" that outlined a regulatory program for state courts
to oversee MDPs controlled by non-lawyers.36

The Commission's proposal was supported by several rationales.
First, the Commission cited heavy client demand coupled with a
complementary interest of lawyers, noting that individual and
corporate clients as well as lawyers from a variety of practice areas

supported MDPs. 3 7 Second, the Commission recognized that the
prevalence of MDPs made regulation a more viable option than a
latent attempt at prohibition.38 The Commission specifically noted
the "increasing number of U.S. lawyers with significant practice
experience [who were] leaving law firms to join ... the Big [Five]." 39
It also warned "that additional care must be taken to assure that

[those lawyers are] not aiding the unauthorized practice of law."4
Third, the Commission felt that it was not compromising the "core
values" of the legal profession41 and made it clear that lawyers were
still bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct.42

The Commission issued its Recommendation and Report to the
House of Delegates in the ABA's annual meeting in 1999. 4" After an

"impassioned" discussion, the vote on the Commission's proposal was
Model; (3) the Law-Related Services/Ancillary Business Model; (4) the Contract Model;
and (5) the Fully Integrated Model. Stuart S. Prince, The Bar Strikes Back: The ABA's
Misguided Quash of the MDP Rebellion, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 245, 262-63 (2000). For
detailed descriptions of the five models see id. at 263; 1999 REPORT, supra note 15, at
App. C2-C4; Marc N. Biamonte, Multidisciplinary Practices: Must a Change to Model
Rule 5.4 Apply to All Law Firms Uniformly?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1161, 1170-72 (2001).
36. See 1999 REPORT, supra note 15, at App. A6-A10; see also 1999
RECOMMENDATION, supra note 32 (outlining proposed actions an MDP must take to
allow court regulation in Recommendation 14).
37. See 1999 REPORT, supra note 15 ("[T]he Commission has concluded that there is
an interest by clients in the option to select and use lawyers who deliver legal services as
part of a multidisciplinary practice .. . [and] that a complementary interest exists among
many U.S. lawyers.").
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. The Commission's first Recommendation was that "[t]he legal profession
should adopt and maintain rules of professional conduct that protect its 'core values.' "
1999 RECOMMENDATION, supra note 32. Loyalty, competence, confidentiality and most
importantly independent professional judgment are the legal profession's "core values"
according to the Commission. Schneyer, supra note 7, at 1471. The core values were also
specifically enumerated in the House of Delegate's rejection of the Commission's
proposal. See ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RECOMMENDATION 10F, at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/mdprecoml0f.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Levinson, supra note 14, at 142-43 (enumerating
Recommendation 1OF's inventory of core values to be protected).
42. 1999 REPORT, supra note 15.
43. Stein, supra note 1, at 1543.
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The postponement

was intended to allow more time for the Commission, as well as
individual state bar associations, to study the impact of MDPs.45
Instead, the anti-MDP faction had bought itself time to grow.46 When

the House reconvened in July 2000, the Commission issued another
diluted report.4 7 This time, however, the debate never even made it
to the House floor, as the delegates overwhelmingly rejected the

Commission's proposal by a 3-to-1 margin.48 Even though many
supporters sought a further extension of time so that states could
continue their individual studies of MDPs,49 the Commission was
disbanded. The House then adopted Resolution 1OF-a provision
which emphatically enforces the Model Rules' position prohibiting
the sharing of fees, ownership, and control with non-lawyers.5"
Despite the lopsided vote, proponents of MDPs roundly
criticized the House. Some were upset by the way the House handled
the vote. One ABA delegate called the House's view "shortsighted"
and referred to the opposing delegates as "a lynch mob."51 He also

blasted the House for subverting innovative client service in favor of
protecting the guild. 2 Other critics of the vote were more concerned
that the vote would trivialize the ABA's position in the legal
profession as the MDP debate would likely move to state bar
associations. One critic called the vote "a move that could balkanize

the profession by leaving each state to decide the question on its

44. Id. at 1543-44.
45. Id. at 1544.
46. Robert R. Keatinge, Colorado and Denver in The House: MDP DeclaredHeresy
by The ABA House of Delegates, 29 COLO. LAW. 48, 50-51 (Sept. 2000) (discussing the
"anti-MDP Jihad" that "generated a combination of xenophobic fervor and fear within the
House" between the time of the debate and the vote).
47.

Compare 1999 RECOMMENDATION,

supra note 32, with ABA COMM. ON

MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2000), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalrep2000.html (last
The 1999
visited Dec. 5, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Recommendation was fifteen paragraphs long and discussed important issues, such as
imputation (par. 8) and requirements for non-lawyer controlled MDPs (par. 14). On the
other hand, the 2000 Recommendation contained five paragraphs and did not elaborate
on any details.
48. Gibeaut, supra note 4, at 92 (noting that the final vote was 314 to 106).
49. Keatinge, supra note 46, at 51.
50. Levinson, supra note 14, at 135.
51. Keatinge, supra note 46, at 48.
52. Id. at 48 ("[W]hile the rest of the world, legal and non-legal, is focusing on
innovative ways of solving legal problems for clients, the House has chosen to focus on
turning the legal profession into a protected guild, limiting the manner in which attorneys
may resolve their legal clients' problems.").
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own."53 Yet another proponent of MDPs wrote, "this profoundly
anti-experimental stance may only encourage MDP supporters to
leave the fractious ABA on the sidelines while they pursue
legalization elsewhere." 54 At the time of the yote the incoming
President of the ABA, Martha W. Barnett, expressed her opinion of
the debate's future, saying, "[r]egardless of what we did here today,
this debate is not going to go away."5 5 Ms. Barnett and others were
remarkably prescient in their assertions: the push for MDPs remains
strong even without the endorsement of the ABA, as the states create
their own studies on how to handle the issue.56
II. THE PRESENT (UNCERTAIN) STATE OF MDP LAW AND VARIOUS
JURISDICTIONAL APPROACHES

As mentioned at the outset, the ABA's rejection of the
Commission's proposal was a "crushing victory [that] was supposed to
end the debate. 5 7 The ABA's endorsement of Resolution 1OF
solidified its position that the Model Rules, particularly Rule 5.4,
were not going to be amended to allow MDPs. With every
jurisdiction except Washington, D.C. having a comparable version of
Model Rule 5.4, the law seemed to be settled. 8 So why then does the
debate continue? This Section elaborates on three reasons why,
despite the apparent closure created by Resolution 10F, the
arguments surrounding MDPs continue: first, the ambiguity of the
terminology in the current Model Rules; second, the emergence of
MDPs abroad; and third, the various regulatory approaches
developed by different jurisdictions within the United States.
A.

Model Rule 5.4 and its Ambiguous Language
The importance of Model Rule 5.4 cannot be understated. It has

53. Gibeaut, supra note 4, at 92-93. Indeed, this seems to be what is happening now.
See infra Part II.C.
54. Schneyer, supra note 7, at 1475. Not only that, but in its haste, "the House . . . put
itself and the rest of the ABA in the awkward position of not being able to participate in
future discussion of MDP." Keatinge, supra note 46, at 52.
55. Martha W. Barnett as quoted by Gibeaut, supra note 4, at 93.
56. See, e.g., ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, MDP INFORMATION BY
STATE, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp-state-summ.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2004)
[hereinafter MDP INFORMATION BY STATE] (describing states' progress on studying
MDPs) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
57. Burnele V. Powell, The Lesson of Enron for the Future of MDPs: Out of the
Shadows and Into the Sunlight, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1291, 1291 (2002) (emphasis added).
58. See Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the "No" Rule Become a New
Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 869, 871 n.2; Stein, supra note 1, at 1537.
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been called "the linchpin of a well-ordered profession,"59 and "all that
Although other
differentiates lawyers from mere businessmen."'
Model Rules play a role in the ban on MDPs, t Model Rule 5.4 is the
cornerstone of the prohibition on lawyers practicing law with, and for,
non-lawyers. Entitled "Professional Independence of a Lawyer," the
Rule states that:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer....
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if
any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of
law....
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a
professional corporation or association authorized to practice
law for profit, if: a non-lawyer owns any interest therein ... a
non-lawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies
the position of similar responsibility in any form of association
other than a corporation; or a non-lawyer has the right to direct
or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.62
It is of particular relevance that Model Rule 5.4 specifically
prohibits a lawyer from "shar[ing] legal fees with a non-lawyer," '63 and
from "form[ing] a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the
activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law."' Model
Rule 5.4 also forbids a lawyer to practice law under the control of a
non-lawyer.65 Remembering that the two main aspects of an MDP
are sharing fees and creating a partnership with a non-lawyer while
practicing law, Model Rule 5.4 clearly targets MDPs that are based on
the ABA's standard definition.
Model Rule 5.4, however, is not as clear as it may appear. It is

59. Burnele V. Powell, Looking Ahead to the Alpha Jurisdiction: Some
Considerations that the First MDP Jurisdiction Will Want to Think About, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 101,116 (2001).

60. Id. at 115 (citing Burnelle V. Powell, Flight from the Center: Is It Just or Just
About the Money?, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1455 (2000)).

61. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.6, 1.7, 1.10 (prohibiting lawyers from
sharing confidential information regarding clients and from representing clients if
representation will lead to a conflict of interest).
62. Id. R. 5.4.
63. Id. R. 5.4(a) (emphasis added).
64. Id. R. 5.4(b) (emphasis added).
65. See id. R. 5.4 (d).
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couched in several undefined or underdefined terms,6 6 the most
significant of which are "legal fees," "partner," and "practice of law."
Model Rule 1.5, which governs fees, does not define the term "legal
fees."6 7

Model Rule 1.5 only cites factors to be considered in

determining such fees 68 and contains restrictions for fee splitting
among lawyers. 69 The term "legal fees" can be interpreted in two
ways, both of which involve additional unidentified terms: (1) fees
generated by the "practice of law" and (2) fees in exchange for "legal
services." The difference in these interpretations causes uncertainty
as to what constitutes a "legal fee."7 L. Harold Levinson explains
that "legal services" is broader than the "practice of law," in that legal
services include not only the traditional practice of law but also
"sporadic and indirect services to clients."'"
More uncertainty arises when other professionals are considered.
For example, it could be argued that a psychiatrist generates "legal
fees" when he suggests to a client that it might be better for his
psyche if he pursues a divorce; or that a financial planner generates
"legal fees" when he urges his client to write a will. While proscribing
the sharing of legal fees between professionals, Model Rule 5.4 does
little to clarify which fees are in fact legal fees.
"Partner" is also left undefined by Model Rule 5.4.72 According
to Model Rule 1.0, "'partner' denotes a member of a partnership, a
shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, or a
member of an association authorized to practice law."73 The terms
"partnership" and "practice of law," however, are not defined by the
Model Rules. 7 4 Under the definition given in Model Rule 1.0, it
would be possible for a lawyer and a non-lawyer to work together as
long as there is no explicit partnership agreement between them.
Model Rule 5.4 could then be easily circumvented by an implied
66. Levinson, supra note 14, at 136 (listing nine terms in Model Rule 5.4 that are
undefined or cloudy).
67. See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.5. Nor does the terminology section or
any other part of the Model Rules. Levinson, supra note 14, at 136, 150.
68. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.5(a)(1) to (8).
69. Id. R. 1.5(e). Sections (b), (d), and (e) discuss the manner in which fees should be
communicated, contingent fees, and a prohibition on certain types of contingencies,
respectively.
70. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 150 (explaining how "practice of law" differs from
"legal services" in the context of legal fees).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 136.
73. See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.0(g).
74. See id.; see also Levinson, supra note 14, at 136 (listing terms that are not defined
by the Model Rules).
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agreement between a lawyer and another professional, something
other than a formal "partnership." This was not the intent of the
ABA when it promulgated Model Rule 5.4 and then reinforced it
In adopting
with the adoption of Recommendation 10F.
Recommendation 10F, the ABA sought to solidify the prohibition
75

against lawyers and non-lawyers sharing practices and fees.

The other major undefined term in Model Rule 5.4 is "practice of

law." This term has regularly troubled the ABA and lawmakers.
Even though unauthorized practice of law ("UPL") statutes have
been adopted in every state but Arizona,7 6 federal and state

legislators, judges, and bar associations have not been able to come
up with a satisfactory definition." The difficulty in defining "practice
of law" was also an issue in the ABA House during the MDP
debate. 78 During the same meeting that the House defeated the
Commission's Report and adopted Resolution 10F, it created the
ABA Task Force on The Model Definition of the Practice of Law
("Task Force"). 79 The Task Force was called upon to come up with
an acceptable definition of the "practice of law" so that UPL could be
prosecuted more easily. There was little success, however, as those
who testified before the Task Force claimed that defining "practice of
law" was "an impossible task."8" Instead, the Task Force proposed
that, "every jurisdiction adopt [its own] definition of the 'practice of
law.' "81 Thus, an integral concept behind MDPs is left to the states to
determine individually, many of which have varying definitions. 2 The
lack of clarity within the terminology of Model Rule 5.4 provides an
75. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 135 (noting that the "immediate target" of
Resolution 1OF was to counter the Commission's proposal).
76. McBryde, supra note 11, at 196 (citing Ronald J. Huefner & Stephen Kellogg,
Attorneys and CPAs: Cooperation or Confrontation?, C.P.A. J., June 1, 1999, at 41, 44);
see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-4 (2001) (UPL statute).
77. See McBryde, supra note 11, at 196 (noting that the definition varies from state to
state). McBryde discusses UPL statutes as they relate to MDPs and notes that many
critics "argue that the best way to deal with the MDP phenomenon is to more strictly
enforce the UPL statutes." Id. at 197-98. However, efforts to tighten the screws on the
Big Five through UPL statutes have thus far been ineffective. Id. at 197.
78. Fred Rodgers, Midyear Meeting of the ABA House of Delegates Held in Seattle,
February2003, 32 COLO. LAW. 29, 29 (2003) [hereinafter Rodgers, Midyear Meeting].
79. Fred Rodgers, Preview of 2003 House of Delegates Agenda Itemns: August Annual
Meeting in San Francisco, 32. COLO. LAW. 53, 53-54 (2003) [hereinafter Rodgers,
Preview].
80. Rodgers, Midyear Meeting, supra note 78, at 29.
81. Rodgers, Preview, supra note 79, at 54.
82. See ABA website at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-defhome.html (last visited
Dec. 5, 2004) (providing links to several states' proposed definitions) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).

2005]

MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES

easy target for those who wish to criticize it and a loose grasp upon
those who wish to evade it, bringing into question the relevance of the
rule.
B.

The Development of MDPs Internationally

Another reason the MDP debate has not disappeared is because
such practices are becoming prevalent around the world. Burnele V.
Powell concludes that the "world ... has already moved well past
where the U.S. legal profession is today." 3 Indeed, one of the
reasons the MDP debate surged in the latter half of the 1990s was
because so many American-educated and trained lawyers were going
to work for one of the Big Five domestically and abroad, where
MDPs are generally allowed.' In 1999, there were four jurisdictions
worldwide that expressly permitted some form of MDP.8 5 Now, there
are several, including Canada, Australia, South Africa, France, Spain,
the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland.8 6 As will be illustrated
below, many of the MDPs that have sprung up in these countries have
done so in conjunction with the Big Five.
1. Canada
Similar to the ABA, in 1997 the Canadian Bar Association
("CBA") created a committee to clarify the CBA's position regarding
"the globalization of the legal practice and the trend towards multidisciplinary practices.""
The CBA developed seven possible
regulatory approaches for MDPs. ss One month after the ABA took
its stance against its own Commission, the CBA adopted Resolution
00-03-A in which it resolved that fee sharing and MDPs should be
83. Powell, supra note 59, at 128.
84. Siobhan Roth, ABA Report: What Now? Planfor Law Firm-Accounting Hybrids
Faces Internal Heat, PoliticalHurdles, LEGAL TIMES, June 14, 1999, at 1, 12. At least one

scholar has noted that the reason it is so easy for American lawyers and law school
graduates to go abroad is that European legal education is quite comparable to American
legal education. John E. Sexton, "Out of the Box" Thinking About the Training of
Lawyers in the Next Millennium, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 189, 191 (2001). This is true in that

the primary focus of each educational system is the development of "thinking like a
lawyer"-a skill that is not impeded by international boundaries and jurisdictions.

85. See Terry, supra note 58, at 883 (Germany, the Netherlands, part of Canada, and
New South Wales, Australia).
86. See infra Parts II.B.1-3.
87.

SPECIAL COMM. ON THE

INT'L PRACTICE OF LAW, MULTI-DISCIPLINARY

PRACTICES: AN INTERIM REPORT (Aug. 1998), available at http://www.cba.org/CBA/
MDP/PDF/InterimReportEng.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (on file with the North

Carolina Law Review).
88. For a brief synopsis of these seven approaches, see Ourednik, supra note 1, at
177-79.
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However, the CBA stopped short of allowing fully

integrated MDPs. In an amendment to Resolution 00-03-A, the CBA
mandated that MDPs be "effective[ly] control[led]" by lawyers.9' It
further emphasized that lawyers should "not practice in MDPs with
other service providers having conflicting ethical responsibilities."'"
While some territories (such as Ontario) subscribe to the CBA
model, others (such as Quebec) fully endorse MDPs.92

Even before this decision by the CBA, Ernst & Young had
established a law office in Ontario.93 Although it is completely made

up of lawyers, and the lawyers do not technically share their fees with
accountants, the firm (Donahue & Partners) is a member of Ernst &
Young International, Ltd., and has to pay the parent corporation a
management fee.94

Now that fee sharing is permitted, however,

Donahue & Partners is less restricted in its practice of law.
2. South Africa and Australia
MDPs have also been legalized in South Africa and Australia. In
Johannesburg, an investment bank acquired all but the litigators from
the Edward Nathan firm." Before 1947, Australian law mandated
that lawyers control 51% of the MDP, but these requirements have
since been relaxed.96 Subsequently, the Australian Competition and

Consumer Commission has recommended that territories repeal97
prohibitions on MDPs, although only New South Wales has done

SO.

89. CAN. BAR ASS'N AUGUST 2000 RES. 00-03-A (2000), http://www.cba.org/cba/
epiigram/november2000/Resolution_00-03-A.asp. (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
90. See CAN. BAR RES. 01-01-M § 1(a) (2001), at http://www.cba.org/CBA/News/
2001_releases/01-02-19_resolution.asp (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (stating " 'Effective
control' means that the lawyer or lawyers in an MDP can, by way a [sic] partnership
agreement or other contractual arrangement ... ensure continuing compliance with the
core values, ethical and statutory obligations, standards and rules of professional conduct
of the legal profession.") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
91. Id. § 2(b). The Resolution gives the example of a lawyer and an auditor as
professions that have conflicting responsibilities. Id. See also infra notes 149-56 and
accompanying text.
92. See A.J. Noble, Ernst & Young Already Manages A "Captive" Law Firm in
Toronto. Is This the Dawn of the Profession'sFuture?, 21 AM. LAW. 51 (1999).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Siobhan Roth, Bar Going Nowhere Fast on MDPs, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 21, 2000,
at 1.
96. See PROF'L CONDUCT AND PRAC. RULES R. 40, 40.1 to 40.5 (Law Society of New
South Wales 1995), at http://www.lawsociety.com.au/page.asp?partid=719 (last visited Dec.
5, 2004) (detailing multidisciplinary partnership requirements for New South Wales) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Terry, supra note 58, at 884-85.
97. Ourednik, supra note 1, at 182-83, (citing Steven Mark, Harmonization or
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The typical MDP in New South Wales consists of lawyers,
accountants, insurance consultants, migration consultants, and a few
others.98 Despite the legalization of MDPs, however, the Big Four
have not yet begun to fully tap the potential of 35,000 Australian
lawyers. 99
3. Europe
Proponents of MDPs often look to Europe to find examples of
the partnerships' success. 1°° MDPs are allowed in various capacities
across Europe. Switzerland allows fully-integrated MDPs.101 Even
though MDPs have existed in Germany since as far back as the
1960s, 1 2 in 1982 the German Constitutional Court, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht, indirectly declared that lawyers actually
have a constitutional right to be partners in MDPs. 10 3 France, Spain,
and Ireland also allow MDPs. °4
Not all European countries are so supportive of an integrated
system, however. The Netherlands, while allowing lawyers to affiliate
with notaries, tax consultants, and patent agents, does not permit
accountant-lawyer MDPs.10 5 This ban was upheld by the European
Court of Justice in 2002.1" There has also been significant opposition
to MDPs by law firms in Britain. In testimony before the ABA
Commission, one professor cited a survey of 350 corporations in
England, of which eighty-eight percent "do not want an
amalgamation of their now independent lawyers and accountants. ' ' 107
Yet, because England does not define the practice of law and does
Homogenization? The Globalizationof Law and Legal Ethics-An Australian Viewpoint,
34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1173 (2001)).
98. Ourednik, supra note 1, at 183.
99. Id. at 182-83.
100. See Stephanie Francis Cahill, MDP Free Europe? European High Court Rule
Against Multidisciplinary Practice, 1 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 8, 8 (2002); Ourednik, supra
note 1, at 184.
101. David Rubenstein, How The Big Six Are PracticingLaw in Europe, CORP. LEGAL
TIMES, Nov. 1997, at 32.
102. See Laurel S. Terry, German MDPs: Lessons to Learn, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1547,
1560 (2000).
103. Id. The court held that regulations limiting the ability of a German tax advisor to
join with non-tax advisors were unconstitutional. Scholars have argued that this decision
applies to lawyers as well as tax advisors. Id.
104. Prince, supra note 35, at 267.
105. Cahill, supra note 100, at 8.
106. Id.
107. Biamonte, supra note 35, at 1183 (quoting Bernard Wolfman, FEBRUARY 2000
HEARING TESTIMONY ON MDP at 2, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
wolfman4.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)).
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not prevent non-lawyers from engaging in it,"°8 there is little to
prevent lawyers and non-lawyers from working together.
The Big Five have been expanding in Europe for several years as
a result of the more lenient MDP rules in many countries. In 1997,
Ernst & Young already had lawyer affiliates in sixteen European
countries. 9 It also owns the largest legal practice in Switzerland."'

Arthur Andersen was allied with the largest law firms in both Spain
and England."' PriceWaterhouseCoopers ("PWC") has 300 lawyers
in thirty-three European countries,112 as well as roughly 2,850 lawyers
worldwide. 3 Deloitte & Touche has legal practices in France,
Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in Spain."'

KPMG's global legal arm, KLegal, including 3,000 lawyers in sixty
countries worldwide, however, was recently disbanded for fear of

"continued" fallout from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.115 Despite added
pressure from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC, PWC, Deloitte
& Touche, and Ernst & Young have no intentions of following
KPMG's lead. " 6
Even with the increased regulation by the SEC in the wake of the

Enron collapse, most of the Big Four continue to capitalize on the
relaxed rules of other jurisdictions by participating in MDPs abroad.
The international growth of MDPs, especially in Europe, has led
many American lawyers to continue supporting accountant-lawyer
MDPs in the United States, so that their firms can stay competitive in
the global market.

7

108. Stein, supra note 1, at 1536.
109. Rubenstein, supra note 101, at 32 (listing France, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy,
Germany, Belgium, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic and Sweden as all having some sort of MDPs
connected to Ernst & Young).
110. Id.
111. Id. Although independently run, the law firms (Garrett & Co. in London and J &
A Garrigues, Anderson y Cia S.R.C. in Madrid) provide legal services for Arthur
Andersen's clients. Id.
112. Id.
113. Molly McDonough, KPMG Cuts Off Global Legal Arm, 66 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 2
(2003).
114. Rubenstein, supra note 101, at 32.
115. McDonough, supra note 113. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. 107-204, § 201, 116
Stat. 771, 771-72 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 2004)). The statute
prohibits accounting firms from issuing audit and non-audit services, such as legal services,
to clients simultaneously. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(g)(8).
116. McDonough, supra note 113.
117. See generally Ruberstein, supra note 101 (noting that support of MDPs in the U.S.
is driven largely by competitive considerations); see also Cahill, supra note 100, at 8
(detailing growth of MDPs in European countries).
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Various Domestic Approaches

Because the ABA fulfills only an advisory function (i.e., it has no
direct authority over lawyers in the United States), the individual
states, through their courts and legislatures, are the sole regulators of
professional ethics." 8 At the request of the ABA Commission, many
states have studied, or are studying, the impact MDPs might have on
their own jurisdictions." 9 Results from these independent state
studies have varied. 120 Although no state has thus far explicitly
allowed fully-integrated MDPs, some jurisdictions, particularly
Washington, D.C. and New York, allow some sort of arrangement for
lawyers and non-lawyers to work together.
Washington, D.C. is the only jurisdiction that allows fee sharing
and partnership agreements between lawyers and non-lawyers. 2' 1
Although it permits MDPs, the D.C. rule only allows partnership
agreements that are "structured as a law firm that provides legal
services." ' Thus, the partnership cannot perform any services other
than legal services-its sole purpose must be to render legal services.
For example, an accountant can be a partner at a law firm but only in
order to assist in the firm's tax practice. 23 Likewise, an economist can
help with a law firm's antitrust practice, and a psychologist can assist
in family law related matters, but neither can render their own
traditional professional services. 12 4 Furthermore, these fee sharing
and interdisciplinary partnerships are only allowed if both the lawyers
and the non-lawyers practice in D.C."z
Despite its unique view, the D.C. exception to the ban on MDPs
has not resulted in many law firms having partners who are nonlawyers.2 6 Two reasons have been given for the lack of interest by
professionals to take advantage of the D.C. Rule. First, the "sole
purpose" clause significantly limits other professionals from joining
the firm.2 7 Second, because many D.C. law firms have offices in
other jurisdictions, they are precluded from participating in such
arrangements. 128 Despite these limitations, Washington, D.C. is a
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Ourednik, supra note 1, at 170.
See MDP INFORMATION BY STATE, supra note 56.
Id.
See D.C. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 5.4 (2000); Ourednik, supra note 1, at 175.
Ourednik, supra note 1, at 176.
Stein, supra note 1, at 1538.
Id.
Ourednik, supra note 1, at 176.
Id.
Stein, supra note 1, at 1539; Prince, supra note 35, at 264.
Stein, supra note 1, at 1539; Prince, supra note 35, at 265.
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pioneer in MDP legislation and regulation and will be looked to as an
example by other states that decide to permit MDPs.
New York, one of the states that supported Recommendation
1OF and the resistance against the ABA Commission, has since
lessened its strong opposition to MDPs.129 In response to a 400-page
report that studied MDPs, the New York State Bar Association
adopted provisions that rejected fully-integrated MDPs, but
supported "side-by-side" arrangements between lawyers and nonlawyers. 130 The revised provisions require that sole responsibility for
legal work rest with the lawyer, and prohibit interference with the
attorney-client privilege.131 Pursuant to the provisions, an attorney's
communications with his clients are to remain confidential, 3 2 and
lawyers must provide their clients with a "Statement of Client's
Rights."' 33 Notwithstanding the restrictions, however, lawyers and
non-lawyers in New York apparently can collaborate side-by-side to
render their professional services to clients.
Washington, D.C. and New York are not the only jurisdictions
that have weighed in on the issue of MDPs. Most state bar
associations have, at a minimum, set up a committee to study
MDPs."' As many proponents of a permissive rule on MDPs
predicted, however, states are widely split. While at least six state bar
associations-California, Colorado, Washington, D.C., Georgia,
Maine, and South Dakota-are pro-MDP (either recommending
support for MDPs or are waiting for a vote), twenty-five have
rejected MDPs outright.'3 5 Fifteen states have either postponed their
studies or are still waiting on a vote; the remaining nine states never
established a committee to do so in the first place.136 This fracture
among the various states has ensured that the MDP debate will
continue. As a result of the scattered state approaches to the MDP
debate, the growing international support, and the ambiguity of the
129. Corinne N. Lalli, Multidisciplinary Practices: The Ultimate DepartmentStore for
Professionals,17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 283, 289, 302 (2003).
130. Id. at 289-90. The revised provisions became effective in November 2001. Id. at
292.
131. Id. at 292-93, (citing John Caher, New York State Bar Chief Will Grapple With
MDP's,N.Y. L.J., June 1, 2000, at 1).

132. Id.
133.

Id.; see also N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGS. CODE OF PROF'L. RESPONSIBILITY

§ 1205.4 (Mary C. Daly ed., 2002) ("[A] lawyer shall provide the client with a statement of
client's rights").
134. See MDP INFORMATION BY STATE, supra note 56.
135. Id.

136. Id. A North Carolina task force issued a report in September 2000 supporting
lawyer controlled MDPs, but no action is pending. Id.
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rules prohibiting MDPs, both opponents and proponents of MDPs
have significant support for their arguments.
III. THE NEGATIVES AND POSITIVES OF MDPs

A.

Arguments Against MDPs

Those in support of the current ban on fee and control sharing
between lawyers and non-lawyers generally claim that they are trying
to preserve the "core values" of the legal profession. Opponents of
MDPs insist that MDPs will erode the independent judgment of
lawyers and the independence of the legal profession as a whole.
They also contend that confidentiality and the attorney-client
privilege will be compromised. Other primary arguments include that
MDPs will create insurmountable conflicts of interest and that
regulation of MDPs will be too difficult. This Section discusses, in
turn, each of these arguments against the construction of MDPs.
1. Professional Independence
The lawyer's ability to exercise professional judgment free from
outside influence has long been a cornerstone of the legal
profession.'
The importance of independence to the legal profession
can be illustrated by the fact that the concepts of professional and
judgmental independence are reiterated at least seven times in the
Model Rules.'38 Professional independence is further emphasized by
Resolution 10F. 39 Opponents of MDPs argue that this independence
140
will erode if lawyers work under the supervision of non-lawyers.
Most opponents assume that there is a direct correlation between
non-lawyers' control of a partnership and the lawyers' loss of
independent judgment. If other professionals start to bring more
money to the partnership, then they will likely be able to exert more
control over firm policies and might compromise lawyers'
judgment.141 Similarly, opponents argue that non-lawyer controlled
137. Biamonte, supra note 35, at 1176.
138. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Preamble, R. 1.7,2.1,4.2,5.4,5.7,and 8.2.
139. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 142 (citing the Resolution for the proposition that
independent professional judgment benefits the public interest); see also supra note 50 and
accompanying text (discussing Resolution 10F).
140. The Commission noted that this was the "most frequently raised concern" in its
investigation. 1999 REPORT, supranote 15.
141. Biamonte, supra note 35, at 1176 (citing L. Harold Levinson, No: Keep the
Profession Distinctive, A.B.A. J., May 1990, at 39) (arguing that such an occurrence would
dilute normative values of the legal profession); Terry, supra note 58, at 891-92 ("The
concern is that lawyers ultimately would follow the dictates of their employers, who don't
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firms will "strip" lawyers of their independent judgment because
lawyers will have to "consider other client needs such as business
strategy, medical problems or family issues instead of only legal
1 42
considerations.'
Opponents also worry that other professions will invade the legal
profession and that the legal profession will lose its identity,
independence, and ethical responsibility if MDPs are allowed. Many
see the Big Five as already infringing on the legal profession because
they offer both auditing and consulting services, the latter of which
look very similar to tax services. 143 The concern about other
professions obtaining traditionally legal work is not limited to
accounting firms. Many other practice areas are also threatened by
MDPs, as "we could soon have title companies openly practicing real
estate law, [and] banks practicing estate planning and probate law."'"
Members of the legal profession rightly fear the loss of their service
niche.
Another potential ramification of the loss of professional
independence is that the legal profession's commitment to pro bono
work might be sacrificed as non-lawyers may be more interested in
generating profits than they are with creating access to justice and the
legal system. 145 Furthermore, "non-lawyers, in their interpretation of
[the Model Rules] are more likely to be influenced by economic
considerations and are less likely to uphold the integrity of the legal
46
profession."1
2. Confidentiality
Currently, Model Rule 1.6 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the
client gives informed consent.' 1 47 This confidentiality requirement
does not discriminate against persons to whom the lawyer can
disclose information-he cannot disclose it to anyone unless one of
understand client needs, rather than following the lawyers' own judgment.").
142. Prince, supra note 35, at 258-59.
143. Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, The Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul
Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 1097, 1097-98 (2000); Stein, supra note 1, at 1534.
144. Stein, supra note 1, at 1530.
145. Lawrence J. Fox, Dan's World: A Free Enterprise Dream; An Ethics Nightmare,
55 Bus. LAW. 1533, 1552-53 (2000).

146. Lalli, supra note 129, at 299-300.
147. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.6(a). Rule 1.6 continues by outlining specific
situations in which an attorney may disclose a client's information such as to prevent
serious injury or bodily harm or to prevent a crime from being committed. Id. R. 1.6(b).
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the exceptions applies. 48 This prohibition would, therefore, forbid
lawyers from confiding in other professionals within the MDP
without the client's consent:
a fact that would make doing business
149

together quite challenging.
Opponents argue that altering the Model Rules to allow MDPs
will also create significant confusion for the client. This will be

especially true in situations where the client divulges information to
multiple professionals, some of whom are bound by a duty of
confidentiality-like lawyers, doctors and psychiatrists-and others

who are not-such as financial planners, accountants in some
situations, and social workers.15 For example, if a lawyer learns of
past child abuse, he cannot disclose the information without the

client's consent. On the other hand, a mental health professional has
an obligation to disclose such information to government
authorities. 5 ' Opponents claim that the client will unlikely be able to
distinguish when the attorney-client (or another) privilege applies and
when it does not. The more the professional services are mixed and
the more distinctions between them are blurred, the larger the
confusion will be for the client as to whether confidentiality is

required. 5 '
3. Conflicts of Interest
A related problem is the increased likelihood of conflicts of

interest. The conflicts of interest that could arise in MDPs come in
two forms: conflicts between different professional obligations and
conflicts between devotion to the client and devotion to the
148. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.6.
149. One may question how lawyers are able to disclose privileged client information
to secretaries or paralegals without violating the attorney-client privilege, yet would not be
able to divulge similar information to other professionals within the same MDP. Most
state responsibility codes charge attorneys with the responsibility of ensuring that nonattorney staff members follow the same rules of ethics that apply to attorneys. See id. R.
5.3 (non-lawyer assistants must follow the same rules of ethics as lawyers). This rule, as it
stands now, does not apply to other professionals, only to assistants. See id. R. 5.3 cmt. 1.
Thus, consent is needed to divulge protected information to other professionals, but is not
needed to disclose the same information to secretaries and paralegals.
150. See, e.g., Ourednik, supra note 1, at 173 (discussing concerns that the client will
not know when privileges apply).
151. See 1999 REPORT, supra note 15 (noting the obligation of a mental health
professional to disclose suspected child abuse); see also David A. Hoffman and Richard N.
Wolman, MultidisciplinaryPractice: Three Dimensional Client Services, 48 MASS. PSYCH
14, 16-17 (2004) (discussing the mandatory reporting requirements for mental health
professionals).
152. Michael Traynor, Some Open Questions About Attorney-Client Privilege and
Work Product in a MultidisciplinaryPractice,36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 43, 45 (2001).
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partnership.
The conflicting duties of the lawyer and the mental health
professional is one example of competing professional obligations.
Another common example of conflicting professional duties is the
lawyer's duty of confidentiality as opposed to the auditor's obligation
of public disclosure.153 This fundamental conflict between lawyers
and CPAs was described by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Arthur Young & Co. 154 as follows:
[T]he private attorney's role [is] as the client's confidential
advisor and advocate, a loyal representative whose duty it is to
present the client's case in the most favorable possible light.
An independent certified public accountant performs a
different role. By certifying the public reports that collectively
depict a corporation's financial status, the independent auditor
assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment
relationship with the client. The'independent public accountant
performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the
corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to investing
public. This "public watchdog" function demands that the
accountant maintain total independence from the client at all
times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.'55
While the accountant must maintain "total independence from
the client" and "owes ultimate allegiance" to the public as well as to
clients, the lawyer must embrace the client's needs and owes
allegiance only to the client and the profession.156
A related argument is that the imputation disqualification157
would have to be completely abandoned with the advent of large
MDPs because it would be almost impossible, especially in big
accounting firms, to avoid conflicts of interest internal to the firm.158
While this dilemma is apparent in large law firms today, it is more

153. Biamonte, supra note 35, at 1179; Prince, supra note 35, at 260; Stein, supra note 1,
at 1533.
154. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
155. Id. at 817-18.
156. Id.
157. See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.10 (proscribing imputation conflicts); see
also Ourednik, supra note 1, at 173 (discussing the potential for imputation conflicts in

large accounting-based MDPs).
158. See Biamonte, supra note 35, at 1184-85 (arguing that members of the Big Five
(now the Big Four) cannot effectively follow the Model Rules, due to size constraints);
Fox, supra note 143, at 1110 (discussing the possibility that an MDP may represent a client
and an adversary without the knowledge of either).
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manageable to construct a "firewall" between the firm and the lawyer
in a law firm of 500 attorneys than it would be in a 1,000 person
service firm with a variety of professionals and their potentially
conflicting duties.
Conflicts of interest are also more likely to arise, opponents
argue, between a lawyer's duty of loyalty in representation and his
duty to the professional partnership. The Model Rules require that a
lawyer base his decisions on the rule of law in the best interest of the
client.159 A partnership agreement with other professionals, on the
other hand, would create a duty of loyalty to the other professionals
involved."6 As a result, lawyers in non-lawyer-controlled MDPs
might be forced to base their decisions on partnership demands rather

than on the rule of law.161 For example, "a lawyer in an MDP may
feel pressure to refer a client to other professionals in the same firm
although the client may be better served by someone outside the
firm.' 1 62 This would obviously violate Model Rule 1.7, which forbids
a lawyer from representing a client when the representation might be

limited by a lawyer's interest or responsibility to others.'6 3
4. Regulation
Opponents also argue that there is no effective way to enforce
MDP regulations. 164 The most commonly suggested solution has been
to have state courts regulate MDPs. 165
However, even some
proponents agree that this would be too arduous and difficult a task

for three reasons.

First, the courts have little or no experience

159. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Preamble, cmt. 2 (requiring zealous
advocacy), R. 1.4, cmt. 5 (citing the duty to act in the client's best interest).
160. As prescribed by general agency law and fiduciary duty principles.
161. Prince, supra note 35, at 257.
162. Morello, supra note 9, at 226. This predicament is generally avoided in large law
firms because often the firm, rather than the individual lawyer, often retains the client's
business. Thus, in most cases, the representation does not change even if one lawyer
refers the client to a lawyer in another department with the same firm. Such a solution
would be untenable in an MDP. A non-lawyer-controlled MDP could not engage the
client for all its service needs because doing so would likely violate UPL statutes and the
Model Rules in that other professionals would be determining the scope of legal
representation.
163. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.7(b), cmt. 1.
164. See, e.g., Written Reply of Sydney M. Cone III (June 22, 1999), at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/cone3.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (arguing that the enforcement
provisions advocated in the REPORT, including administrative audits and judicial
oversight, are inadequate to ensure compliance with the Model Rules) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
165. This was the Commission's suggestion as to how to regulate non-lawyer-controlled
MDPs. 1999 REPORT, supra note 15.
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regulating multidisciplinary issues."6 Thus, there is no template for

regulation. Second, the courts are often "reactive enforcers," in that

they only get involved after a complaint has been filed.167 Third, the

dearth of judicial funds available to enforce ethics provisions will
prohibit effective progression of regulation. 168 As a result, enforcing
unrealistic."169
"procedurally
be
would
regulations
MDP
Furthermore, since the ABA alone has not been able to prohibit

accounting firms from providing some legal services, it is unlikely that
conflicting views of several professional regulatory boards17° would be
able to regulate fully-integrated MDPs.
B.

Arguments in Support of MDPs
In addition to trying to discredit the arguments to the contrary,

proponents of MDPs have cited many reasons why the creation of
professional partnerships would benefit the legal profession. These

arguments are more varied than their counterparts and include:
meeting client demand, providing better client services, keeping up
with other professions and the rest of the world, and regulating them
before it is too late, as de facto MDPs are already spreading.
1. Meeting Client Demand

According to the Commission's Report, the primary reason for

allowing and regulating MDPs is to meet increased client demand.'71
With rapid growth in technology and the globalization of the
economic and legal markets, "the advice a client needs must draw
upon the talented resources of all ... professions in order to be
effective."' 7 2 As businesses and lifestyles become more integrated, so
too must the professional services that are provided. Clients of all
166. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 7, at 1492 (asserting that, because most interference
risks have been pre-empted by discouraging the conditions under which they may arise,
there is little judicial precedent for dealing with the unique issues raised by MDPs).
167. Id. at 1481-82. Judicial regulation of MDPs, however, would likely require "active
enforcement" due to the novelty of the entities. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Regulatory boards include the ABA, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (which promulgates its Code of Professional Conduct), and the American
Psychological Association (which promulgates its Ethical Principles of Psychologists and
Code of Conduct). See Ourednik, supra note 1, at 168 n.7.
171. 1999 REPORT, supra note 15; see also Lalli, supra note 129, at 296 (noting that
consumer demand is the "strongest force driving this trend forward," and that "[o]ur
nation has long since relied on consumer demand to drive the market and acceptance of
the MDP trend should not be any different").
172. Stein, supra note 1, at 1531.
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sizes and needs are now looking for integrated services and one-stop
shopping. Large corporations with legal, financial, and tax issues seek
advice from several professionals and would benefit from integrated
legal services.'7 3 New generations of individual clients expect and
demand easy satisfaction of their professional service needs.174 The
elderly, in particular, have a significant need for integrated
professional services. 75 Although some opponents argue that client
demand is a "myth,"' 76 and while proponents realize that MDPs may
not be the best solution for every client in every legal situation,
allowing MDPs will simply create another option for the client.
2. Providing More Efficient, Less Costly Services
Another popular argument proffered by proponents is that
MDPs will increase the quality of service provided to clients in a
variety of ways.' 77
With better coordination and easier
communication between service providers, costs (for both
professionals and clients) will decrease and services will become more
efficient and easier to access. 178 A more diverse selection of
professional services will result in better consumer protection for
clients. 179 Larger networks among professionals will also increase
"the speed with which attorneys respond to client issues."18° Finally,
using one firm for an entire transaction or personal issue will
"provide the client a higher degree of trust and confidence that all
aspects of the transaction will be understood and handled

appropriately. "181
173. Jim Kelly, Long Arm of the Law: The Big Five May be Right That Clients Want
Them to Move into Legal Services, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999, at 29; Prince, supra note 35,
at 253-54.
174. Stein, supra note 1, at 1531-32.
175. See Ourednik, supra note 1, at 189-90 (explaining how and'why the elderly would
benefit from being able to only have to travel to one service provider for assistance with
estate planning and financial advice).
176. Fox, supra note 143, at 1108.
177. Biamonte, supra note 35, at 1166.
178. McBryde, supra note 11, at 194 (citing James W. Jones & Bayless Manning,
Getting at the Root of Core Values: A "Radical" Proposalto Extend the Model Rules to
Changing Forms of Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1183 (2000)). The costs that
will supposedly decrease include transaction, research, contracting, coordination,
monitoring, and information costs. Lalli, supra note 129, at 297.
179. McBryde, supra note 11, at 213.
180. Biamonte, supra note 35, at 1166.
181. Id.; see also John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Shaping the Future of Law:
ABA's MultidisciplinaryPractice Proposals Will Stymie the Growth of MDPs, Golden Age
is Over, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2, 1999, at 27 (arguing that the "extra" regulation proposed
by the ABA is unnecessary and will create inefficiencies for corporations that have to seek
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3. Keeping Pace with the Globalization of the Economy
Proponents also cite the need to keep pace with accounting firms
domestically and large integrated professional service firms globally.
Already, "[a]ccounting firms are vigorously seizing the opportunity to
' of
satisfy client demand for [the] newly developed market niche"182
one-stop shopping. Thus, while big law firms in the United States are
able to create large networks of lawyers, they are dwarfed by the
accounting firms that have offices in almost every major city in the
country and around the world.183 Proponents argue that giving
lawyers access to this enlarged network is essential if the legal
profession is going to stay on the cusp of the internationalization and
expansion of professional services." As MDPs are already allowed
in many European countries and Canada, proponents seek to
"harmonize the legal practice into the new economic reality."18' 5 If the
United States' legal profession is going to stay globally competitive,
MDPs seem to be a requisite.
4. Getting Involved Before It Is Too Late
Another argument in support of MDPs is that MDPs are already
here, 86 and if the legal profession is going to survive, it must be able
to regulate MDPs on its own terms. The ABA has already
jeopardized its ability to regulate MDPs by leaving the issue to be
debated by the states individually. If the states do not begin
regulating them soon, however, MDPs will control themselves or
Proponents feel that the legal
business will move elsewhere.
profession is quickly being passed by the professional-serviceproviding industry,187 and that if U.S. lawmakers do not embrace the
MDP revolution, then the legal profession will be left withering in its
wake.
IV. PRESENT DE FACTO MDPs AND OTHER ANCILLARY
BUSINESSES AND WHAT THEY CAN TEACH Us ABOUT THE FUTURE

OF MDPS
Although fully-integrated MDPs are prohibited in the United
States, lawyers and non-lawyers are finding ways to work together in
services from multiple providers).
182. Lalli, supra note 129, at 287.
183. Biamonte, supra note 35, at 1166.
184. Prince, supra note 35, at 254.
185. Stein, supra note 1, at 1531.
186. See, e.g., infra Part IV (presenting examples of current MDPs).
187. Powell, supra note 59, at 128.
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de facto MDPs. While these partnerships and practices are not
technically MDPs under the ABA's definition, they involve lawyers
working alongside accountants, mental health professionals,
physicians, financial consultants, workplace managers, and/or other
professionals. De facto MDPs come in the form of large, professional
service firms with corporate clients and smaller, more individualservice-based boutiques. This Section of the Comment examines
some of these de facto MDPs that exist today despite the MDP ban.
It discusses how they either meet or dispel concerns and expectations
in order to illustrate what regulators should require and forbid as
MDPs push their way into the professional service sector in the
United States. The arguments for MDPs, specifically satisfying client
demand and enhancing the quality of service, apply to almost all types
of MDPs. However, the small individual client-supportive firms more
easily dispel the concerns regarding MDPs. Thus, future regulators
will be better off following the examples of the boutiques rather than
the large professional service firms.
A.

Large ProfessionalService Firms

It is no secret that large accounting firms have invaded the legal
profession in the United States. One outraged member of the legal
profession has described the actions of the Big Five'88 as "a frontal
assault on the legal profession"' 89 and a "guerilla war."" The Big
Five have appropriated work, lawyers, and clients from the legal
profession at an astonishing rate.' 9'
These self-proclaimed
"professional service firms" practice tax, ERISA, employment,
mergers and acquisitions, and other consulting services,"f all of which
have been traditionally practiced solely in law firms. In fact, some
professional service firms have even represented clients in federal
district court and federal claims court.193 Furthermore, the Big Five
have hired a significant number of lawyers. As early as 1997, the Big
Five each employed hundreds of lawyers. 9 4 Since then, the number
188. For consistency's sake, the author uses the term "the Big Five" despite Arthur
Andersen's recent collapse. See supra note 8.
189. Fox, supra note 143, at 1097.
190. Id. at 1107.
191. See, e.g., id. at 1097 ("[T]he accounting firms have hired thousands of lawyers who
leave their law firms on Friday and show up on Monday doing the exact same thing for the
exact same clients, but now as employees of the non-lawyer Big [Five].").
192. Id. at 1097.

193. Stein, supra note 1, at 1534-35.
194. See Elizabeth MacDonald, Lawyers Protest Accounting Firms' Hiring, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 22, 1997, at B8 (noting that Ernst & Young had hired 800 tax lawyers; PWC had
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has grown significantly. If measured by the number of lawyers
employed in 2000, Arthur Andersen was the biggest law firm in the
United States with 1,800 lawyers.' 95 The numbers have undoubtedly
continued to increase as now the legal 96staffs of the Big Four are
expanding by about thirty percent a year.
Large professional service firms are not keeping their legal
practice secret from the public. In 2000, Arthur Andersen placed a
full-page ad in the New York Times Magazine which promoted its
"Legal Services."' 97 Ernst & Young advertises its construction
litigation support services on its web page. 198 Ernst & Young even
launched its own law firm, McKee, Nelson, Ernst & Young, in early
2000.199 The other professional service firms have also advertised
litigation support and merger and acquisition services.2 °
The Big Five practice law even though Model Rule 5.4 proscribes
lawyers from "practic[ing] with or in the form of a professional
corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit" if
the entity is owned or controlled by a non-lawyer.20 1 Regulators have
been unsuccessful at keeping large accounting firms from providing
what appear to be legal services in part because of the Supreme
Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia Bar. 2°2 Golfarb held that
"non-public bar associations are subject to federal antitrust laws, and
as such, not permitted to limit competition between lawyers and nonlawyers. '2 3 Skeptics, on the other hand, say that the Big Five are too
big to regulate and the lawyers within them are simply "blatantly
violating" the rules.2°
Although the Big Four may not be MDPs per se, they are clearly
a major force in the MDP debate. Not only were they one of the
hired 500; and Arthur Andersen had hired 1,000).
195. Tia Breakley, Note, Multidisciplinary Practices: Lawyers and Accountants Under
One Roof, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 275,298 (2000).
196. Sexton, supra note 84, at 191-92.
197. Fox, supra note 143, at 1107.
198. See Ernst & Young website, at http://www.ey.com/global/Content.nsf/US/AABSSpecialtyAdvisory-IDS_-_Services-_ConstructionLitigation.html (last visited Dec.
5, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
199. Fox, supra note 143, at 1100; see also Lawrence J. Fox, New Firm: Wolf in Sheep's
Clothing, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24, 2000, at A23 (discussing the new firm).
200. See, e.g., Deloitte Touche & Tohmatsu website, at http://www.deloitte.com (last
visited Dec. 5, 2004) (listing "legal" under the firm's service tabs) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
201. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 5.4(d). See Powell, supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
202. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
203. Ourednik, supra note 1, at 185 (citing Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792-93).
204. Fox, supra note 143, at 1097.
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primary reasons that the ABA Commission was created in the first
place, 20 5 but they are also the primary reason the House of Delegates
rejected the Commission's proposal and affirmed the stance taken in
Rule 5.4.206 Each of the primary arguments against MDPs discussed
above applies to, and is accentuated by, large professional service
firms. In addition to infringing upon practice areas and luring lawyers
away from law firms, the Big Four are encroaching on the
independence of the legal profession, especially in terms of
influencing lawyers' decisions. 0 7 It is more likely that a lawyer's
independent judgment will be compromised in a large firm where the
lawyer pulls less weight than in a smaller MDP like the ones
described below.
The problem with conflicting duties of
confidentiality is also most readily apparent in the lawyer-accountant
partnership as the lawyer has a duty of confidentiality while the
accountant has a duty to disclose.2"' Although the Big Four are wary
of the problem and are trying to resolve it,20 9 this is still the largest
obstacle facing lawyer-accountant MDPs. Finally, as a result of their
sheer size, enforcing imputation in the Big Four would be nearly
impossible,2 0 as would regulating the conflicting professions.
The advantages of MDPs are also less significant in large
professional service firms than in the boutiques described below.
Cost effectiveness, while important to corporations, will likely have a
larger, more intimate impact on a single mother of three in a divorce
proceeding. While large corporate clients are certainly aware of cost
reduction, the care and facility of one-stop shopping will have a more
immediate benefit to an elderly man who has difficulty driving or an
apprehensive employee who has just lost her job and must still
provide for her family.
While one-stop shopping helps large
corporate clients satisfy their desires, they at least have access to such
services, even if that means working with multiple firms. Individuals,
on the other hand, especially poorer ones, do not always have easy
access to needs such as safe, affordable housing, personal financial
planning, and psychological counseling, to name a few.
While some argue that regulation of MDPs would have
205. See supra notes 25-28, 39 and accompanying text.
206. Biamonte, supra note 35, at 1188.
207. See supra Part III.A.1 and accompanying text.
208. See supra Part III.A.2 and accompanying text.
209. See Biamonte, supra note 35, at 1179-80 (discussing how members of the Big Five
consider strategic maneuvers to avoid confidentiality and conflict of interest problems
within the firm).
210. Id. at 1184-86 (arguing that "[t]here is no practical way that the Big Five ... can
ever adopt the legal profession's requirement of imputation").
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prevented catastrophes such as Enron,211 each of the arguments
against MDPs applies to large lawyer-accountant MDPs.2 12
Furthermore, the advantages of MDPs discussed above do not apply
to large professional service firms and their clients with the same
effect as they do to the smaller, individual client-based boutiques
discussed below. As large lawyer-accountant MDPs also appear to be
one of, if not the, primary reasons that the ABA rejected the
Commission's proposal in July 2000, the legal profession runs a great
risk by allowing MDPs that include accountant-lawyer partnerships,
particularly the large, corporate client service firms. This does not
mean, however, that MDPs as a whole should be discarded.
B.

Boutiques

While the large accountant-lawyer de facto MDPs seem to
embody all of the negative concerns surrounding the allowance of
professional partnerships, smaller, lawyer and non-accountant de
facto MDPs exhibit ways to counter the negatives and embrace the
positives, setting an example for future regulators. As a result of the
size and services offered, MDPs such as Boston Law Collaborative,
LLC, and the Boston Medical Center's Family Advocacy Program
demonstrate important client services that would be unavailable
without lawyers and non-lawyers working together.2" 3
1. Boston Law Collaborative, LLC
Boston Law Collaborative, LLC ("BLC") calls itself a
'
"multidisciplinary law firm"214
that is "fully permissible under the
215
'
existing ABA rules."
BLC consists of seven attorneys, a
psychologist, a financial planner, and a workplace consultant.2 16 The
211. See Powell, supra note 57, at 1299 (arguing that "if the legal profession had put the
multidisciplinary practice safeguards in place two years ago when it had the opportunity to
do so, Enron would probably not have happened").
212. See Ourednik, supra note 1, at 169 (noting that the "problem ethical areas
including confidentiality, independence, conflict of interest, and assurance that all
providers of legal services adhere to and are governed by the rules of ethics," existed at
Arthur Andersen, which in turn led to the demise of Enron).
213. Although both of these particular case studies are from the Boston area, their
geographical location is merely a coincidence. They are meant to exemplify small,
individual-based de facto MDPs, rather than define the jurisdiction's position regarding
MDPs.
214. See Boston Law Collaborative, LLC website, at http://www.bostonlaw
collaborative.corn (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) [hereinafter BLC website] (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
215. Hoffman and Wolman, supra note 151, at 14.
216. See BLC website, supra note 214.
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primary practice areas are family law, employment law and business
law;217 the professionals generally deal with common individual
problems such as divorce, child custody, job loss, and partnership
disputes.2 1 The members of BLC have their own practices but work
together to provide a "full range"219of services in the fields of law,
mediation, psychology and finance.
A smaller, interdisciplinary arrangement is advantageous to both
and the client. The system provides the professionals
professional
the
with a "three-dimensional" way of seeing the clients' problems and
Working together provides the
understanding their needs.22 °
professionals with a better perspective on how they can help the
client, as lawyers and CPAs are not qualified to treat psychological
issues for their clients and may not always understand the complex
Similarly, a psychiatrist may not
dynamics of a workplace.2 1
understand the legal issues that surround a patient's dilemmas. Ease
of communication between professionals leads to more effective
resolution and increased familiarity with other professional
perspectives, thus broadening the trust and understanding of the
This collaborative style is more easily
other professionals.22
facilitated in a small firm like BLC than in a large MDP firm.
As a result of the efficiency and ease of collaboration among
professionals, the client in turn receives a more "holistic" legal
experience. At BLC, the objective is "to make clients feel seen,
heard and cared for in an emotionally respectful atmosphere."2 23 The
client is not left to deal with the emotional stresses that come with
divorce, old age and job loss without the aid of a professional who is
trained to deal with such stressors. Instead, the client can rely on
professionals who understand each other's work and her specific
problems. Because the sorts of everyday legal problems dealt with by
BLC can be both emotionally stressful and financially precarious, the
collective advice from a variety of professionals who are working
together to understand the client's needs is much less taxing on the
client than individual opinions from different professionals who do
not normally work with each other.22 4 On the other hand, because a
217. Id.
218. Hoffman and Wolman, supra note 151, at 14.
219. BLC website, supra note 214.
220. See Hoffman and Wolman, supra note 151, at 14.
221. Id. at 16.
222. Id. at 14.
223. Keeva, supra note 12, at 96.
224. Hoffman and Wolman, supra note 151, at 15. Furthermore, the client is less likely
to receive conflicting advice from professionals who work together. Id.
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corporate client typically seeks services in a different context, it may
not fully appreciate the emotional advantages of an integrated legal
experience.
The familiarity of BLC's professionals with each other and each
other's profession would be much more difficult in a 1,000 person
firm. Simply as a matter of size, members of larger law firms and
professional service firms are less able to interact with other
members. Cross-professional interaction and understanding are
easier to achieve in a smaller setting.
In addition to embodying many of the advantages of an MDP,
BLC has also found ways to remain fully lawful under Model Rule 5.4
and counter most concerns of MDP opponents. Each profession in
BLC maintains a separate business entity and charges and collects its
own fees for services rendered. 25 Thus, it appears to comply with the
prohibition on fee sharing and partnerships. No member of BLC
votes on any aspect of the practice of a differing profession; thus,
professional judgment is preserved. Each professional asks the clients
for waivers of confidentiality if they believe that consultation with
another professional will be advantageous to the client.226 If the client
decides not to sign such a waiver and a consultation with another
professional is needed, the professionals may collaborate, but they
refrain from giving any identifying information about the client in
their discussions.227 The firm also makes a practice of informing the
client at the outset of consultation which information and
conversations are confidential and which are not, so as to avoid the
conflict of duty of the mental health professional to disclose and of
the lawyer to keep client confidences.228 Once again, waivers of
confidentiality and avoidance of internal imputation conflicts would
be much more difficult to obtain in a large professional service firm.
By staying within the Model Rules and dispelling the major
critiques of professional partnerships, BLC is able to serve a certain
type of client: the individual. While de facto MDPs such as BLC will
not necessarily be the best choice for every individual client, it
provides those clients who are looking for interdisciplinary help the
225. Keeva, supra note 12, at 96; see also BLC website, supra note 214. Each
profession also maintains separate filing systems and separate computer systems to protect
confidentiality. Id.
226. Id. These waivers of confidentiality are not mandatory by any means and only
pertain to waiving the privilege so that other professionals at BLC can be privy to
information.
227. Hoffman and Wolman, supra note 151, at 16.
228. Id.; see also supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
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ability to obtain integrated services.
2. The Boston Medical Center's Family Advocacy Program
Since 1993, lawyers and pediatricians have worked together at
the Boston Medical Center ("BMC") in the Family Advocacy
Program ("FAP") to help treat and prevent illness and injury,
primarily for poor children.2 3 ' Recognizing that there is a direct
correlation between low-income and inadequate health care, the FAP
helps poor families "access safe and affordable housing, nutrition and
income support, education placements, supplemental social security
income, and resolutions to domestic violence complaints. ' 23' By
incorporating three attorneys into its clinical treatment team, the
FAP is able take advantage of the multidisciplinary aspects of the
various professions to better provide for the patient.232
Made up of mental health professionals, pediatricians, and
lawyers, the clinical treatment team assesses patients' needs and
develops appropriate plans of action for children suffering the effects
of trauma. 233 One of the attorneys' jobs is to provide training and
legal assistance to the pediatricians. 234 The presence of the attorney is
crucial to the success of the team because it:
[A]llows clinicians to move beyond the traditional treatment
modalities of in-office therapy and psychopharmacology and to
assist families in changing or overcoming environmental
stressors-such as substandard housing; inadequate income;
custody, guardianship and visitation concerns; special education

229. For client feedback and praise, see Keeva, supra note 12, at 97 (discussing a
specific client's reaction to the services rendered).
230. Pamela Tames et al., The Lawyer Is In: Why Some Doctors Are PrescribingLegal
Remedies For Their Patients,And How the Legal Profession Can Support This Effort, 12
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 505, 505 (2003).
231. BOSTON MEDICAL CENTER, at http://www.bmc.org/developmentlbmc%20
programs/family-advocacy.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
232. See Tames et al., supra note 230, at 505 (stating that "since 1993, lawyers have
helped pediatricians at BMC and affiliated community health centers prevent illness,
injury and malnutrition").
233. Id. at 510.
234. See FAMILY ADVOCACY PROGRAM, Job Opening for Staff Attorney, at
http://www.bmc.org/pediatrics/special/fap/jobs.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (outlining
the role the lawyers play in the FAP) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see
also Tames et al., supra note 230, at 506 (arguing that "the pediatric setting is a natural
choice to implement advocacy interventions with poor families" because [p]ediatricians
"are well-positioned to perform preventative screening for psycho-social issues that may
be remedied by legal advocacy").
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[A]rmed with
access; and immigration status issues....
legal
rights,
clinicians
about
the
family's
essential information
are more likely to address these issues with a patient's family
and feel secure in the knowledge that if a family needs help, a
referral to FAP for legal assistance is easily accessible.235
In addition to assisting other professionals, FAP lawyers also
counsel individual families whose children are patients at BMC.
Primarily through free walk-in clinics, FAP lawyers assist in matters
relating to family law, domestic violence, and a host of other
problems that typically plague indigent families.2 36 By offering such
services, the FAP "helps low-income families meet their basic needs,
'
thus increasing the likelihood of family stability and child health."237
Public interest programs such as FAP do not present the same
threats, such as stolen practice areas, that traditionally concern the
opponents of MDPs. 238 Issues of confidentiality and conflicts of
interest are addressed with waivers and upfront instructions to the
Likewise,
clients/patients about limitations on privileges. 23 9
professional independence is maintained because even with the
collaboration, the lawyers practice law and the pediatricians practice
medicine; there is no crossing of practice area boundaries.
While mitigating concerns about some of the negative aspects of
MDPs, the FAP also provides many of the benefits of MDPs, as well
as additional access to justice. The legal services rendered by FAP
are low-cost because they are provided primarily to poor families.
The collaboration between the lawyers and doctors translates into
more efficient service, as the two professions become accustomed to
each other's jargon, culture, and customs. 240 Not only is the alliance
geared towards low-cost, effective service, but it is also "consistent
with the legal profession's core value of public service. '241 FAP
creates access to the justice system that would otherwise be
unavailable to many indigent clients. Thus, in FAP, the advantages of
allowing MDPs are met: the service is cost effective and efficient, the

235. Tames et. al., supra note 230, at 510.
236. See FAMILY ADVOCACY PROGRAM, Family Services, at http://www.bmc.org/
pediatrics/special/fap/family-services.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (listing the types of
services offered by the walk-in clinics) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
237. Tames et. al., supra note 230, at 508.
238. Id. at 508-09.
239. See id. at 524-25 (discussing confidentiality complications and how they are
normally managed).
240. Id. at 509.
241. Id. at 508.
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market demand is met, and the quality of service for the patient is
better than it otherwise would be. At the same time, the core values
of the legal profession are preserved and every effort is made to avoid
confidentiality conflicts of interest, since the doctors do not impinge
on the lawyers' line of work.
3. Other Ancillary Cooperative Businesses
The systems employed by BLC and FAP are not the only ways in
which lawyers and non-lawyers can work alongside each other
without violating Rule 5.4. Professionals are not prohibited from
sharing office suites in hopes of generating walk-in clients as long as
certain guidelines are followed:24 2

each profession must keep a

separate computer system;2 43 the various professionals can advertise
together as long as it is clear that each is a separate entity;244 and
professionals can also refer clients to one another if there is no
referral fee or expectation of reciprocal referrals.245 While several
ethical issues surround office sharing arrangements,246 such a
cooperation of professionals has the same advantages as the
boutiques described above. Lawyers and non-lawyers can also work
together in a partnership if they do not practice law, such as in an
"ancillary business" governed by Model Rule 5.7.247
As they exist today, de facto MDPs-whether one of the Big
Four, a boutique such as BLC or FAP, or another office sharing
arrangement-are the sole measuring stick that proponents and
opponents have to judge potential future regulation. Most of the
arguments, however, have been hypothetically based. As state bar
associations continue to study the effects of MDPs on society and the
legal profession, they should keep in mind how publicly important
MDPs such as BLC and FAP can be. Future regulators should also
take note of how efficiently collaborations like these are able to
dispel opponents' concerns and expand on the advantages of MDPs.
At the same time, regulators should not overlook the enhanced
concerns that large, financially driven, lawyer-accountant MDPs
embody.
242. Levinson, supra note 14, at 146.
243. Id. at 148-49.
244. Id. at 146-47. The use of a common trade name and partnership appearance
violates Resolution 1OF and Model Rule 5.4. Id. at 148.
245. Id. at 146.
246. See id. at 146-49 (discussing various ethical issues surrounding office sharing
arrangements).
247. Rule 5.7 is beyond the scope of this paper, however.
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Go FROM HERE?

The MDP debate is not going away. Even though MDPs have
been re-banned by the ABA and several states, pressure to allow such
collaborations continues. Such endorsement alone suggests that the
battle will carry on and that proponents will persist until MDPs are
permissible in the United States. Proponents have not given up yetwhat is to stop them now?
If the MDP issue is going to continue until there is some sort of
regulation permitting professional partnerships, there are three
approaches regulators can take: (1) do nothing, permitting interested
lawyers to find ways to get around the rules, and let the Big Four
overshadow the legal profession; (2) allow MDPs of all shapes and
sizes, as was the Commission's approach in the late 1990s; or (3)
regulate MDPs to take advantage of their benefits to the public while
restricting their shortcomings and potential harm to the profession.
The first option is not preferable because eventually a large part
of the corporate legal profession will be completely controlled by the
Big Four, as accounting firms continue to envelop practice areas and
lure lawyers away from law firms. The Commission in 1999 and 2000
already proposed the second option. While it received praise, the
proposal was rejected for fear that much of the legal profession would
be compromised or completely consumed by the large accounting
firms and international businesses.
The best way to achieve the third option is to begin regulation
slowly. Learning from de facto MDPs and altering the rules little-bylittle will prove more beneficial to the profession in the long run. The
ABA should allow certain combinations of professionalspediatricians and lawyers, financial consultants and lawyers, and with
the proper restrictions psychologists and lawyers-to work together
in size-restricted settings. While some have argued that a simple
distinction between large and small MDPs is all that is needed,24 8 this
distinction only scratches the surface of the issue. Rulemakers should
also consider the client base and the purpose of the MDPs they
permit. Allowing MDPs that serve individual clients and benefit the
public at large will not only be easier to monitor and regulate, but
also be more widely accepted by the legal profession, as the majority
of lawyers work in small firms with individual clients. It is already
clear how these types of MDPs can avoid the concerns and threats to
the "core values" expressed by opponents. Likewise, it is evident that
248. Biamonte, supra note 35, at 1189-91 (arguing that MDPs operated by small firms
would not raise some of the problems feared by the opposition).
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doing so would be much more difficult, if not impossible, in large,
corporate client professional service firms. Thus, it only makes sense
to allow those MDPs that help the public and do not harm the legal
profession. The MDP revolution is upon us, and while we should
embrace the benefits it can bring, we should not cede the entire
profession to a concept that has limited applicability.
REES M. HAWKINS

